The Police and ATS
Appearance – I believe Don Bradman once said that to be a good cricketer you have first to look like a good cricketer. This is exactly what I want to apply here – our police might look good enough as a force to enforce the rule of law against the local goons, robbers, etc (which is also questionable) but they don’t even begin to resemble a force which can handle seriously trained terrorists/insurgents/organized criminals. To illustrate this even more compare the look of the fully kitted commandos versus those we saw sitting around in the buses without their ski-masks looking like just any other uninformed force (not very imposing at all). When they were kitted out fully they seemed a highly professional, trained and focused force which would have without doubt instilled a sense of awe into any one facing them. This is exactly what is needed for the police forces or rather a section of them. Improve their looks and get them to be smarter/fitter and better equipped (come to that later). There is a reason why military forces practice marches, parades and dress formations and it is not about looking good to Republic Day crowds – the reason is to inculcate a discipline within the ranks which allows them to present a thoroughly professional and focused appearance when facing the enemy – something which if portrayed successfully can be very demoralizing to the opponent. (for parallel examples one can look at the All Blacks Rugby team performing the haka – their pre game war dance)
Gap in force specialization - The US city police forces have specialized divisions within them called SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams who exist for the purpose of handling situations which the ordinary police could not. They look far more imposing than the average police and they are but not necessarily anywhere close to the marines/delta forces/seals etc each of which can be compared to our NSG. However what they do is to provide the police with a response mechanism which can either handle more complex situations or in case the situations turn out to be even out of their league, at least provide reasonable amount of resistance till the next level of forces take over. This is sorely missing in our forces where be it the regular police, the ATS or the other local forces all exist on more or less one level with simply no skill in at the very least holding a situation leave alone solving it. The need for a specialized “SWAT” style force in our cities is absolutely critical.
Outdated tactics – The police in our system have for ages relied on the theory of the force of numbers which unfortunately in today’s times of highly advanced weaponry as well as protective equipment and training proves to be counter productive leading at times to a casualty ratio which is ridiculously high even when facing minor numbers albeit better trained (eg again these terrorist attacks). World wide the handling of such situations is left to specialized forces which are lean in numbers but disproportionately effective in applying force backed up by conventional forces as a 2nd line of defence. Such tactics will automatically come into play once the police have specialized units to handle such situations
Leadership –I am going to touch upon an extremely sensitive topic here. The Mumbai police force lost 3 of its top leadership in one moment right at the beginning of the engagement leaving the force demoralized??? Headless?? wondering where to look next. Without doubting the bravery of the officers who died, the point to be made here is – was it necessary for these senior officers to put themselves right in the front line and risk all???? And this is not an argument about better body armour, etc. That is all bull. In a military engagement the general does not stand at the front but he is no lesser a man because of it. The general stands at the back and directs operations not because he cannot fight but because he can think and strategise better. Similarly the soldier in the frontline is not put there because he cannot think but because he can fight better than he can think. The idea of leading men into battle however romantic it may be is rarely sound of logic. Men by nature need leaders (which not everyone can be) to look up to and it is for this reason that the leaders need to be protected. Cut off the head and the body becomes pretty much useless. (Our army has a high casualty ratio of officer:enlisted men – sure this might be great for drumming up patriotic fervour but you cannot even imagine the amount of morale boost the enemy is getting when he sees our leaders falling first). Accordingly what is needed is a well thought out doctrine for the police forces which ensures that they follow certain avowed systems to ensure that their senior officers do not go down fighting while their juniors go down thinking.
Response Timing: The police need to have a doctrine in place which envisages a number of situations and the appropriate responses for each with a defined set of procedures which would kick in the moment an incident is reported. This doctrine would also need to have a very clear chain of command set out as well as communication channels outlined so that in case of escalation of situation no time is lost in securing the next level of help. In case of the Mumbai terror attacks the Maharashtra Chief Secretary was the one who appealed to the Navy for deployment of MARCOS. I am quite sure this was not part of any standard operation procedure but simply an SOS sent out in desperation to the nearest force available.
Availability of Response Units: There is talk of locating NSG divisions in Mumbai and other cities. For sure this is a step in the right direction but in my view this step in isolation will not help. A country as large and vast as India cannot possibly have specialized units in every town and city just sitting around waiting to go into action. Specialized units by definition are limited in number but highly mobile with quick deployment capabilities. The need of the hour is to work backwards from an anticipated situation and work out the earliest response times given certain strategic postings of the specialized units. In an ideal situation the country could have 5-6 NSG/quick reaction force centres each of which would have been located with the intention of providing the quickest possible response within a set radius. For this purpose they should be equipped and provided with standalone infrastructure to react to and respond to any call. The sight of NSG commandoes commandeering BEST buses to reach South Mumbai from the airport is quite ridiculous. For them to be a complete unit they cannot depend on any other branch of govt/private enterprise.
Equipment: There is absolutely no debate on the fact that our police units work with weaponry and protective equipment which would not even stand up in a WWII theatre. Who are we fooling here – not the enemy for sure and definitely not the police themselves. I cannot comment on the technical aspects of equipment but you cannot thrust a police officer/constable into a confrontation with a Special Forces style terrorist armed only with wooden sticks, six shooters, riot gear and whistles/payphone size wireless sets for communication. The only solution is to provide the latest, most effective equipment along with right training to the police.